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A B S T R A C T 
It is my aim, in this paper, to illustrate the restrictive nature of the ontological assumptions that give rise to an excessive focus on autonomy 
characteristic of much traditional moral theory. Through a discussion of the implications of good friendship, I show that a differently-conceived, 
relational conception of the self can lead to reflective moral practices of a sort that is consonant with feminist concerns. 
R E S U M E 
Dans cet expose, mon but est d'illustrer la nature restrictive des presupposes ontologiques qui entrainent une attention excessive a l'autonomie. Cette 
attention a l'autonomie est typique d'une grande partie de la theorie traditionnelle de la morale. A travers une discussion au sujet des implications d'une 
amitie soltde, je tente de montrer q u i l serait possible de formuler differemment un concept relationnel du moi, ce qui aboutirait a des pratiques morales 
reflechies qui seraient en harmonie avec le point de vue feministe. 
1. Introduction 
T h e autonomous moral agent has l o n g been the hero of 
phi losophica l m o r a l discourse: the person—indeed, more 
accurately the man—whose modes of being and acting are 
manifestations of the achievement of moral maturity and 
goodness. Wri t ings about moral development and moral 
education emphasize the need to structure these processes 
so that rational , self-conscious, moral ly autonomous 
individuals w i l l be their products 1 ; and the realization and 
maintenance of autonomy is widely taken to be an unchal-
lengeable goal of m o r a l life. A l l of this notwithstanding, i t 
is my intention to dispute the value of autonomy as an 
overarching ideal. It is my belief that its achievement 
w o u l d not, and indeed c o u l d not, s ignal the realization of 
a moral ly and pol i t i ca l ly viable way of life, and that to 
posit achieved autonomy as the mark of mature moral 
being excludes f rom the scope of moral commendabil i ty 
many h u m a n beings whose conduct, i n fact, merits moral 
approval . I shal l suggest that a " c o m m u n i t a r i a n " posi-
t ion analogous to one being articulated i n some versions 
of feminist thought, originates i n a mode of moral reflec-
t ion preferable to autonomy-oriented traditional modes. 
It may sound odd to start from an assumption that 
feminists are wel l advised to challenge the hegemony of 
autonomy as a mora l value, for it has been a central 
feminist preoccupation to urge women to strive for auton-
omy and to support pol i t i ca l measures deemed likely to 
promote autonomous female existence. It w o u l d be fool-
ish to m i n i m i z e the importance of struggles for autonomy 
i n feminist thought and action, both early and m u c h more 
recent. 2 Mary Wollstonecraft's Vindication of the Rights 
of Women might be read as a plea for a form of female 
autonomy, albeit a l imi ted form by late twentieth century 
standards (and a form w h i c h requires a w o m a n to be 
"more l ike a man" ) . M u c h of contemporary feminist writ-
i n g , too, c o u l d be seen as h a v i n g as one of its most vital 
aims the art iculat ion of a conception of autonomy, under-
stood to involve both freedom from oppression by patriar-
chal structures and attitudes, and freedom to realize one's 
o w n capacities and aspirations. 
Indeed, it w o u l d seem to be beyond dispute that the 
achievement of some measure of autonomy has to retain a 
place amongst feminist goals. M y p o i n t is that tradit ional 
ph i losophica l interpretations of autonomy as a value have 
tended to lead to an autonomy-obsession w h i c h serves no 
one's purposes wel l . Yet, the choice is not an outright one 
between interdependence or autonomy, conceived as 
oppos i t iona l terms. It is a matter of discerning how an 
appropriate balance is to be achieved between autonomy 
i n its various manifestations, and c o m m u n a l solidarity. 
2. Moral Autonomy: The Received View 
In Kant's phi losophica l writ ings one finds the strongest 
statement of a pos i t ion where autonomy is accorded pride 
of place. Here, " a u t o n o m y " is understood to refer to the 
exercise of the freedom of the w i l l of a rat ional , self-
conscious agent, to the self-determination of that w i l l , 
quite apart f rom any object wi l l ed . T h i s is the conception 
of autonomy i m p l i c i t i n the two pivotal claims (in the 
Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals) that the good 
w i l l is the only th ing good i n itself; and that duty must 
override inc l inat ion i n moral deliberation and i n action 
based u p o n i t . 3 T h e continued h i g h esteem i n w h i c h the 
achievement of autonomy is held, however, is not an 
esteem for autonomy understood precisely as Kant under-
stood it. In more recent mora l discourse and i n work o n 
mora l education, derivative connotations of independ-
ence, self-sufficiency, freedom, and the right to self-
government received special emphasis. These differences 
i n connotat ion are not so signif icant for my purposes as is 
the c o m m o n thread of assumptions l i n k i n g the various 
meanings. These reflect a character ideal w h i c h is neither 
the on ly possible such ideal nor one w h i c h merits u n q u a l -
if ied approval . 
In A n t h o n y T r o l l o p e ' s novel , The Warden, the moral 
attitude of the zealous y o u n g reformer, J o h n B o l d , might 
be taken to capture something of what is i m p l i c i t i n 
K a n t i a n , and Kantian-derivative, mora l autonomy, w i t h 
its inf lexible rule of duty over i n c l i n a t i o n . It is Bold's 
miss ion to b r i n g about reform i n the A n g l i c a n clergy, 
part icularly amongst those w h o seem to be abusing the 
privilege of their office for unwarranted f inancial gain. H e 
includes i n this campaign the Warden of H i r a m ' s H o s p i -
tal, a m a n whose character is of the finest, and whose 
comfortable f inancia l circumstances are the consequences 
rather of good fortune than of deviousness. Despite Bold's 
fr iendship w i t h the Warden, and his love for the Warden's 
daughter, he resolves to pursue his course single-mindedly. 
H e asks, "Because I esteem M r . H a r d i n g is that a reason 
that I should neglect a duty w h i c h I owe...? or should I give 
u p a work w h i c h my conscience tells me is a good one, 
because I regret the loss of his society?" Regarding Eleanor 
H a r d i n g , he maintains , " i f she has the k i n d of spirit for 
w h i c h I give her credit, she w i l l not condemn me for d o i n g 
what I th ink to be a duty. ... I cannot for her sake go back 
f rom the task w h i c h I have commenced." ' 1 So he embarks 
u p o n a course of action w h i c h w i l l r u i n M r . Harding 's 
reputation and destroy h i m psychologically. 
Bold's actions show something of both the strengths 
and weaknesses of a K a n t i a n approach. H i s story suggests 
how Kant ian moral theory might i n fact provide guide-
lines for action i n "confl ict of interest" situations. Strong 
respect for pr inc ip le must be cultivated i n the moral ly 
good, for this enables one to stand f i r m against emotional 
temptations, neither to abuse nor misuse one's p u b l i c 
station or privileges for the sake of f a m i l i a l and/or 
friendly allegiance. Such p r i n c i p l e d persons w o u l d not 
stoop to patronage, preferential treatment, or favouritism, 
but w o u l d live as exemplars of the practice of impart ia l i ty 
required by the autonomous realization of the moral law 
w i t h i n . T h i s is how one might see J o h n B o l d : his p r i n c i -
ples are of the highest, adopted for the sake of goodness 
rather than for personal ga in . H e adheres strictly, and 
strongly, to them: inc l ina t ion (affection, friendship, love) 
are not permitted to interfere w i t h the performance of 
duty. 
Despite its moral strength one might well not a p p l a u d 
Bold's stance. T o understand why is to see some of the 
l imitat ions of this view of moral life where, to quote 
Robert P a u l Wolff , "Despite his overriding concern for 
mora l matters, Kant never seems to have asked himself the 
fundamental question, what is it for one man to stand i n a 
real relation to another m a n ? " 5 T h e dismay that one 
might feel at J o h n Bold's actions suggests that there could 
be something amiss i n an unwill ingness to consider the 
moral requirements of the personal relationships into 
w h i c h he has entered as freely as he has embarked u p o n his 
reformist campaign. Yet, a Kant ian might applaud this 
aspect of it, for emotions, o n Kant's view, are suffered, 
undergone, dissociated from rationality, and hence threat-
en ing to autonomy. It is the autonomy of reason, of 
rationality, that is to be realized i n truly moral beings. 
Emot ions , i n the face of w h i c h one is declared merely 
passive, must be transcended. 6 
Even if one approaches Kant ian morality o n its o w n 
terms, apart from the feminist challenges it invites, it is 
clear that a moral i ty w h i c h w o u l d always exalt duty over 
loyalties that h u m a n relationships enjoin is not a liveable 
moral i ty . A l t h o u g h such loyalties may indeed be at the 
root of "confl ict of interest" abuses of moral principle , it is 
di f f icult to see why it should be assumed, i n such conflicts, 
that publ ic projects (in Bold's case, the reformist undertak-
ing) should, as a matter of course, prevail over private ones 
(his strong affective ties). Such a rule of conduct may make 
mora l dec is ion-making simpler; but, it does so at the 
expense of obscuring the complexity of a pr imary moral 
task of effecting a balance between often equally justifia-
ble claims of duty and incl inat ion. 
Kant ian moral theory views persons not only as auton-
omous but, as many feminist moral theorists have now 
argued, as moral atoms, whose central experiences do not 
include close personal relationships. Rather, these seem to 
be both anomalous, and threatening to moral integrity. 
T h i s is true even of the "respect for persons" formulat ion 
of the categorical imperative. Taken together w i t h the 
pr inc iple that the m a x i m u p o n w h i c h one acts must be 
universalisable, and often elaborated in terms of rights 
and duties, it requires people to deny or override any 
special relationships between themselves and others in 
m a k i n g moral decisions. Such emphasis u p o n the rights 
of autonomous individuals, and a m i n i m a l consideration 
of responsibilities of specific h u m a n beings to, and for, 
one another, often produces a tension, for moral agents, 
between claims of impartial i ty and particularity. 
It seems to be a curious moral requirement, particularly 
f rom a developmental point of view, that moral rights 
should be taken to command impart ia l respect. People 
learn about moral i ty, to a great extent, i n terms of respon-
sibil i ty, care, and concern, as they owe them to, or see that 
they are appropriately directed toward, specific other 
h u m a n beings. It is odd that such a t ra in ing should be 
expected to mature into the u p h o l d i n g of an ideal of 
impar t ia l moral reasoning. As for the underemphasis 
u p o n self and action that goes a long w i t h this, it is not easy 
to see h o w a moral judgement made from a purely impar-
tial stance can be conceived as one's o w n judgement. 
A c t i n g u pon such a judgement w o u l d seem to have little 
to do w i t h one's o w n mora l goodness. Yet, it is not a mark 
of moral slovenliness to a l low that one cares about one's 
o w n moral goodness. I suspect one w o u l d be moral ly 
reprehensible if one d i d not. 7 In short, there is a serious 
discontinuity between the requirements of Kant ian moral-
ity, and the prephi losophical experiences, insights, and 
intuit ions of actual subjects. 
A l t h o u g h an ideal of autonomy as such does not figure 
so prominent ly i n ut i l i tar ian ethics as i n the Kant ian 
scheme, there is a comparable tension, for uti l i tarians, 
between claims of impartial i ty and particularity. N o r does 
it stretch ut i l i tar ianism too far to declare there to be strik-
i n g affinities between uti l i tarians and Kantians w i t h 
respect to their assumptions about the k i n d of being w h o 
is "the moral agent." Indeed, M i l l ' s belief in "the i n d i v i d -
u a l ' s " capacity to know and choose what is i n his o w n 
interests, and his consequent arguments against paternal-
i sm might wel l be taken to be premised u p o n a conception 
of "the autonomous moral agent" not unl ike the Kant ian 
one. Yet, prima facie one might think ut i l i tar ianism pref-
erable to Kant ian ethics where claims of impart ia l i ty as 
against those of particularity are at issue. For it cou ld be 
argued that, i n ut i l i tar ian terms, actions beneficial to 
friends, relations and pol i t ica l comrades are good in that 
they tend to increase one's o w n pleasure as the agent of 
such actions. T h i s pleasure appears to lend support to the 
c l a i m that there are positive duties to benefit those for 
w h o m one cares. 
T h i s , in fact, only appears to be the case. Ut i l i tar ian ism, 
too, is based i n a strong impartial i ty requirement, accord-
i n g to w h i c h it is really one's duty to act so as to produce 
the greatest possible general uti l i ty. Concern for particular 
persons benefitted or harmed is merely incidental and 
p r i m a r i l y instrumental. Relationships to such persons 
cannot be granted inherent value, for d o i n g what benefits 
one's friends, colleagues, or country is w r o n g if it hinders 
the product ion of a greater good for a larger number of 
people. Indeed, a ut i l i tar ian might f i n d himself (and the 
masculine pronoun is the appropriate one here) i n the 
paradoxical situation where the product ion of benefit for 
strangers, or even for enemies, is more conducive to uti l i ty 
than any alternative course of action, even in spite of the 
extent to w h i c h his o w n displeasure at needing to do so 
detracts f rom the ut i l i ty produced. 8 T h i s ut i l i tar ian con-
ception of persons as interchangeable units of moral 
action, benefit, judgement, and decision-making is closely 
tied to the value placed u p o n i n d i v i d u a l i s m and self-
realization in the libertarian and i n the German romantic 
traditions. For orthodox uti l i tarians, as l o n g as the total 
ut i l i ty created is great, the identities of the beneficiaries are 
not significant. 
W h i l e it is not my intention to present a comprehensive 
survey of the place accorded to autonomy and its anal-
ogues throughout moral and pol i t ica l discourse, it is 
worth remarking that contractarian theories of social 
organization, both early and late, 9 assume that the i n d i -
viduals w h o w o u l d make and endorse such contracts 
w o u l d be "male , adult, economically self-supporting, and 
psychological ly self-sufficient" 1 0 . A l t h o u g h Sartre writes 
from quite a different tradition and set of assumptions 
about man's existential choices, affinities w i t h the empha-
sis u p o n self-making and separate self-sufficiency i n the 
positions I have discussed are evident throughout his 
writ ings. 
A first step toward re th inking the relations between 
mora l agents and their communit ies involves the task of 
trying to effect a reconcil iat ion between equally legitimate 
h u m a n requirements for autonomy and mutuality. It may 
help to try to view these two kinds of concerns as inter-
woven rather than as opposi t ional and confl ictual ; one 
might then be able to see the value of autonomy i n a more 
appropriate perspective. 1 1 
3. From Ontology to Ecology 
Autonomy-oriented moral theories rest u p o n a cluster 
of ontological assumptions w h i c h are as m u c h prescrip-
tive as descriptive. N o t only do they start from an i m p l i c i t 
descriptive premise to the effect that h u m a n beings are 
creatures of a sort that can sustain separate and self-
sufficient existence, this same premise assumes prescrip-
tive impl icat ions i n the further assumption that the telos 
of h u m a n existence is the fullest possible realization of 
self-sufficiency and individual i ty . Such an ontological 
stance yields the sparsest of pictures of what it is to be 
h u m a n , borrowed not from one of the richest interpreta-
tions of h u m a n possibilities but from one of the thinnest. 
Where it is counted adequate, even for theoretical pur-
poses, to treat h u m a n beings s imply as bearers of rights, or 
even as rat ional , self-conscious agents, it is smal l wonder 
that a picture emerges of separate and opposi t ional ly-
divided individuals , c lutching their rights jealously to 
them, and l o o k i n g u p o n other h u m a n beings not only as 
other but as a l ien, potential ly threatening those rights by 
their very existence. 
Concentrat ion u p o n the otherness of other h u m a n 
beings has several consequences. First of a l l , the opposi -
t ional tone of the discourse suggests that people are not 
o n l y different one f rom another, but essentially opaque to 
one another. Rather than starting f rom the perfectly p l a u -
sible assumption that there might be a significant degree 
of commonal i ty and mutual i ty , individual is t ontology 
and the moralities derivative from it take isolation and 
separation to be essential starting points of h u m a n moral 
l i f e . 1 2 A t the same time, and perhaps paradoxically, such 
theories concentrate so m u c h u p o n formal sameness i n 
their str ipped-down versions of what it is to be h u m a n that 
h u m a n beings—whether as bearers of rights, or as rational , 
self-conscious agents—emerge as virtual ly interchange-
able units, u p o n the relative merits of whose claims a fairly 
s impl is t ic decis ion-making procedure can pronounce. 
Assumed formal sameness and interchangeability impede 
the development of an adequate conceptual apparatus for 
c o p i n g w i t h relevant, and often h i g h l y significant, differ-
ences between and amongst h u m a n beings; rather, such 
differences are set u p as opposi t ional modes. Hence the 
best that such theories can a l low i n terms of encounters 
w i t h difference is a pale, p lural is t ic attitude of l iberal 
toleration: a bare recognition of difference-in-isolation 
w h i c h is to be tolerated but need neither be understood nor 
cared about. 
Against this ontological backdrop it is easy to see why 
interdependence and cooperation are taken to be lesser 
modes of being than autonomous separateness. They 
involve an undesirable compromise of autonomy and self-
sufficiency, a failure of self-reliance. T h e picture of 
h u m a n society as comprised of a random assembly of such 
discrete, separate individuals is of a society for w h i c h 
interdependence is at best manageable, when carefully 
regulated; at worst, it is straightforwardly threatening. T o 
see h u m a n beings as essentially separate and self-contained 
seems to i m p l y that they are not only opaque to one 
another but also potentially a l ien and alienated one f rom 
another even i n their (atomistic) sameness. Social contract 
theory i n many of its forms reflects just this view. 
It seems to be beyond dispute that the h u m a n race has 
arrived at a historical moment at w h i c h the mode of being 
of the l iberal i n d i v i d u a l , " p u l l i n g himself u p by his o w n 
bootstraps" and p u r s u i n g self-fulf i l lment, cannot be 
advocated as one w h i c h could serve h u m a n beings wel l i n 
the present (world-)polit ical situation, face to face w i t h the 
end of this species, and of a l l species. O u t of reflection 
upon this species and other species, and u p o n ecological 
interrelations both w i t h i n and amongst them, one can 
begin to develop one potentially fruit ful way of rethink-
i n g these ontological issues. 1 3 
Ecological reflection focuses u p o n relations of organ-
isms with one another, and u p o n relations between organ-
isms and their environment. By "envi ronment" I mean 
not just the physical environment, nor only the present 
environment, but a complex network of relations w i t h i n 
w h i c h an organism realizes, or fails to realize, its potential, 
be those relations historical, material, geographical, social, 
inst i tut ional , or other. In l o o k i n g at how an organism, at 
any moment i n its history, reflects its current state of 
accommodation both of and to such relations, I mean to 
emphasize the participation of organisms, whose choices 
are relationally structured, and w h o sometimes can them-
selves have a shaping effect u p o n relational structures. 
Where discussion is of h u m a n organisms, this participa-
tory mode contrasts strongly w i t h the removed stance of an 
ideal, impart ia l observer whose agency, too, reflects this 
separateness. 
W i t h its biological origins, ecological discourse works 
f rom the assumption that there is continuous process and 
change w i t h i n its objects of study. Its use is intended to 
dispel any suggestions of stasis. Hence this k i n d of onto-
logical reflection does not have as its a i m the art iculation 
of an alternative essentialist account of what it is to be 
h u m a n , w h i c h w o u l d denounce, yet r u n parallel to, 
autonomy-centered ontology. Rather, it is reflection both 
u p o n implicat ions, for organisms, of creating and sustain-
i n g an environment conducive to realizing good ways of 
l i v i n g . (Such reflective practice can profitably be engaged 
i n even i n the absence of a fully-elaborated conception of 
what is to count as goodness as it might be attributed of a 
way of l iving.) 
Suffice it to say by way of a beginning, though, that the 
o p t i m a l development of any organism, from the simplest 
to the most sophisticated, is dependent u p o n a complex of 
appropriate ecological conditions and is influenced posi-
tively or adversely by changes i n these conditions, just as 
changes i n organisms, reciprocally, influence those same 
conditions. Secondly, i n p u t t i n g the case ecologically, I 
am expressing the belief both that it is vital to arrive at a 
reshaped conception of the kinds of community that it 
might be best for h u m a n beings to inhabit , and that viably 
reshaped conceptions cannot be developed solely w i t h i n 
the terms of efficiency-oriented, benefit-maximizing ethics, 
whose agents and beneficiaries alike are separate i n d i v i d -
uals standing u p for their rights. I m p l i c i t i n the doubts I 
have expressed about the overarching value of autonomy 
is a convic t ion that a mora l system for w h i c h moral ob l i -
gat ion is b i n d i n g only when it is autonomously con-
tracted into has no place for a conception of a common 
good; rather, it can a l low only the aggregate of i n d i v i d u a l 
goods, a whole that is no greater than the sum of its parts. 1 4 
In appeal ing to an ecological analogy as a starting 
point for t h i n k i n g differently about h u m a n ontology and 
moral agency, my point is to indicate how inextricably the 
factors that shape and influence any one life are intercon-
nected. W h i l e I concentrate upon aspects of h u m a n rela-
t ionship i n what fol lows, it must be borne i n m i n d that 
this is a matter of focus for purposes of this discussion. 
H u m a n interaction cannot, i n practice, be separated out 
or understood apart f rom the material, environmental , 
historical , personal (both conscious and unconscious), 
and other factors that shape interacting persons and inter-
actions themselves. Neither can a l l of these factors be 
explored at once. 
It should be noted at this point , however, that a l though 
this ecological metaphor seems to have considerable heu-
ristic value for o p e n i n g a new perspective on ontological 
issues, it is clearly not without drawbacks. T h e most 
serious of these w o u l d seem to be that ecosystems always 
survive at the expense of some of their members, and that 
concentration u p o n communi ty commonly results i n 
suppression, if not a n n i h i l a t i o n , of some of the (minority) 
members of that community . It is for this reason, above a l l , 
that autonomy needs to retain a central place even w i t h i n 
an ecological picture: that the tension between ecological 
and autonomy-preserving concerns needs to be regarded as 
a productive tension, to be maintained rather than ignored 
or dissolved. 
H u m a n beings w h o w o u l d emerge as the subjects— 
though not as the heroes—of an ecology-derived discourse 
can perhaps most fruit ful ly be characterised ( fol lowing 
Carol ine Whitbeck) as "re lat ional and historical beingfs] 
whose creativity and moral integrity are both developed 
and realized i n and through relationships and practices" 1 5 . 
T h i n k i n g i n terms of relations and historical experiences 
(both one's o w n and those of one's " c o m m u n i t y " ) as 
constitutive of what each person is as a continual ly evolv-
i n g h u m a n self al lows one to see each life as a nexus of 
many other life-lines and experiences, a l l partial ly separ-
ate and partially interrelated and interdependent. Speak-
i n g of creativity and integrity together shows that neither 
of these is a static concept but that they, too, evolve i n a 
constantly interactive process. H u m a n beings are never 
quite what they were or w i l l be; and this fact is as m u c h 
dependent up on their interaction, both communal and 
environmental , as it is u p o n their o w n nature, to the 
extent that it makes sense to refer to such a th ing apart 
from its constitutive circumstances. 
T h e core of the ontological pos i t ion Whitbeck articu-
lates is constituted by a self-other relation "between beings 
w h o are i n some respects analogous,...[where] the scope 
and l imi ts of that analogy...are something to be explored 
i n each case" (p. 75). T h e point is to approach the fact of 
h u m a n interdependence to discern its enabl ing possibi l i -
ties rather than to concentrate u p o n the constraints it 
might present. It is possible that, out of such an approach 
there could emerge a realization that "sameness" and "di f -
ference" need neither be viewed as polarities i n a dichot-
omy, nor be translated into superiority and in fer ior i ty . 1 6 
They might work as interactional, reciprocally def in ing 
modes, points i n the history of h u m a n relations, rather 
than terms i n opposi t ion to one another. 
W h i l e I see considerable promise i n this relational pic-
ture of h u m a n ontology Whitbeck proposes to develop, I 
am less convinced by her endorsement of Sara Ruddick 's 
v i e w 1 7 that "maternal t h i n k i n g " can serve as a model for 
this new self-other relation. One can endorse Whitbeck's 
c l a i m that masculinist, patriarchal relations are stand-
ardly modelled u p o n individual is t ic , autonomy-oriented 
ontological assumptions and a l low that a potentially 
more ecologically valuable way of conceiving what it is to 
be h u m a n can be modelled u p o n the " l iberat ion of 
women's relationships and practices'' (p. 79) wi thout hav-
i n g to take the further step of m a k i n g mother ing activity 
the central (and essential?) such practice. If the point is to 
derive feminist reflection u p o n ontology-morali ty from 
modes of relationship traditionally best practiced by 
women, then close personal friendships w o u l d seem to be 
m u c h better candidates, and far less cultural ly charged. 
T h e fact that men, too, sometimes experience such friend-
s h i p — i f perhaps (stereotypically) infrequent ly—might be 
taken as a reason i n favour of bel ieving that some insights 
can be gained from t h i n k i n g about women's friendships 
i n their various manifestations, since the prospects of 
developing a more broadly relevant ontological point of 
view o n this basis w o u l d then be better. T h a t they do not 
even i m p l i c i t l y exclude women who do not mother, or 
w h o do not mother w e l l , is a further p o i n t i n their favour. 
T h e rarity of genuine friendships whose core is such as to 
foster a "(mutual) realization of people" (Whitbeck, p. 65) 
is surely no greater than that of the clear and unproble-
mat ic m o t h e r i n g re la t ion W h i t b e c k (wi th R u d d i c k ) 
admires. 
T h e value of such friendships for understanding possi-
bilities of reciprocal self-other relations can be affirmed 
even i n spite of the belief, central to psychoanalytic prac-
tice, that women's friendships w i t h other women may, i n 
fact, tend to replicate features of mother-chi ld relations. It 
w o u l d be dif f icult to designate any close relationship that 
is w h o l l y free from replicat ion of some aspects of a per-
son's pr imary relationships. Fr iendship, at least, is dis-
tanced from that core, and may sometimes afford more 
readily accessible forms of c o m i n g to terms w i t h its 
residues, if on ly i n that there is less to be undone at the 
outset. 
Fr iendship takes many forms and, again, I do not want 
to offer an essentialist account of that it must be if insights 
are to be gained f rom reflection u p o n it. Some of its 
c o m m o n features can be mentioned, if only to be revised or 
disputed. In friendships at their best, a balance between 
autonomous separateness and appropriate interdepend-
ence is often effected and mainta ined by the mutual i ty of a 
caring, trusting relat ionship between the participants. 
Established friendships tend to be able to cope, over time, 
w i t h f luctuations i n degrees of int imacy and i n levels of 
dependence and independence. T h a t this is taken to be one 
of the better forms of h u m a n relat ionship is manifest i n 
the laudatory tone of pronouncements to the effect that X 
is not just Y's mother, but also her friend; that A and B are 
not on ly lovers, or spouses, but friends. By contrast w i t h 
mothering, fr iendship often seems to be able to admit of 
degree wi thout engendering gui l t ; and it can encompass 
aspects of parenting and other forms of caregiving wi th-
out being essential to them, or required of them. T h o u g h 
such relationships w i l l not always be characterisable as 
friendships, they may sometimes be, and chances are that 
they w i l l be better so. Fr iendship may be able to accom-
modate its o w n growth and to contribute to the growth of 
its participants, often by c o m i n g to terms w i t h ambivalen-
ces and ambiguities a k i n to those i m p l i c i t i n mother-chi ld 
relations, but w i t h a potential at least of being less emo-
tionally fraught. T h i s is a fertile locus for development of 
trust, and for c o m i n g to understand trust i n considerable 
" s e m a n t i c d e p t h . " 1 8 Indeed, it may bean even more prom-
is ing locus than the mother-chi ld relat ionship because i n 
friendship there are often, f rom the beginning, symmetri-
cal possibilities w h i c h are u n l i k e l y to exist i n quite the 
same way between mother and c h i l d i n view of their 
evident inequali ty, at least i n the early years. Hence i n 
fr iendship a productive sameness-and-difference interplay 
may be more readily possible because the relationship is 
not necessarily rooted i n so obvious a difference. A l t h o u g h 
intimate friendship has l o n g been taken to be a women's 
practice, and devalued accordingly, the fact that there have 
also been great friendships between men, and between 
men and women, m i g h t a l l o w it to have the heuristic 
value claimed for maternal t h i n k i n g w i t h none of the 
accompanying rhetoric needed to show how men (and 
childless women) can also be mothers. 
I think friendship w o u l d better serve the purpose, then, 
of designating a k i n d of relationship that could provide 
the starting point for a feminist approach to ontology. 
N o r is it necessary to search for an essential kernel of what 
fr iendship is to be able to derive from experience of the 
myriad practices that warrant the label (if perhaps only 
provisionally) some sense of how autonomy-obsession 
might be displaced. Some characteristics of these practices 
could be extended, by analogy, to serve as shaping ideals 
for less personal h u m a n interaction, particularly when 
these ideals are pursued i n conjunction w i t h ecological 
t h i n k i n g about the creation of social situations i n w h i c h 
h u m a n wel l -being could be realized. I have i n m i n d some-
t h i n g l ike this: one might think of relationships that 
constitute h u m a n lives metaphorically, as patterns of con-
centric circles, many of w h i c h intersect w i t h relationships 
that constitute other lives, and one might try to see 
whether the outer circles, representing more formal , less 
affectively central relationships i n one's life, w o u l d work 
o n an analogy w i t h more central ones. For those accus-
tomed to the autonomy-centered mode, this w o u l d l ikely 
involve a radical re th inking of their sense of self and of 
others, whose primary manifestation might be i n a work-
i n g away from defensive t h i n k i n g both about w h o one is, 
and about how one should act. Such a reorientation might 
work to undermine the long-standing assumption that 
there are two utterly distinct kinds of relationships i n 
h u m a n lives: private, emotional, personal ones, and pub-
lic , formal, impersonal ones. These tend to be regarded as 
separate kinds of relationships belonging to different parts 
of a life and having relatively few features i n c o m m o n i n 
terms of one's appropriate attitudes to, and modes of par-
t ic ipat ion i n , them. T h i s contributes to an assumption 
that there is and, indeed, should be a split between one's 
private and p u b l i c self, w i t h the projects of the latter 
accorded greater value. T h i s is wel l illustrated by the story 
of J o h n Bold . 
Part of what communitar ian ecological t h i n k i n g w o u l d 
seem to enjoin is a dissolution of the public/private 
dichotomy. M y concentric circles metaphor is meant to 
suggest how this might be approached. Core, affective, 
private relationships seem to be some of the factors most 
centrally constitutive of h u m a n selves both i n their earliest 
developmental stages and i n a l l of their later moments. It 
seems reasonable to suppose that, if one were not con-
strained by alleged ethical demands to separate oneself i n 
one's publ ic life from these relationships and the responses 
they evoke, one might permit them to play a role i n 
shaping one's p u b l i c attitudes and responses as w e l l . T h i s 
w o u l d involve approaching more publ i c aspects of one's 
life w i t h a less intimate version of the open and trusting 
characteristics of friendship, w o r k i n g from a presumption 
that mutual understanding is more, rather than less, 
l ikely, though prepared to th ink differently should the 
situation clearly require it. Hence one could cultivate 
receptiveness to possibilities of commonal i ty and trust i n 
less central relationships that w o u l d contrast sharply w i t h 
the zealously maintained separateness of autonomous 
being. In this context it w o u l d make perfect sense to assert, 
as Whitbeck does, that "the not ion of moral responsibil i -
ties that go w i t h relationships... [is] a fundamental moral 
n o t i o n " (p. 66). Relationships, thus understood, w o u l d be 
ecological i n the broad sense I have indicated above, and 
seeing them thus might a l low for a f ru i t fu l cont inui ty of 
t h i n k i n g between this more specifically ethical enquiry 
and broader po l i t i ca l concerns, as these are embodied, for 
example, i n the ecology movement itself, i n the peace 
movement, and more wide-ranging socialist concerns 
about how best to create a liveable environment for 
h u m a n , and other, life. 
4. Reflective Practice 
In Tro l lope ' s novel it is perhaps a coincidence that it is a 
w o m a n — h i s sister—who dissuades J o h n B o l d from the 
dogged pursuit of his reformist project, u r g i n g h i m to 
acknowledge the moral claims of his loves and allegiances. 
It is out of just such a seemingly coincidental gender 
differentiation i n moral response that C a r o l G i l l i g a n has 
developed the thesis that, i n moral matters, male and 
female agents speak i n different voices from one another. 1 9 
Indeed, one might envisage presenting the J o h n B o l d 
d i l e m m a to G i l l i g a n ' s subjects; and tabulators of the 
results might perhaps f i n d male subjects tending to 
respond as B o l d himself does, female subjects tending to 
draw attention to considerations his sister finds more 
important. 
G i l l i g a n ' s project is to reinterpret the results of L a w -
rence Kohlberg's tests designed to measure mora l matur-
ity. She is persuaded that the fact that female subjects have 
tended consistently to score lower on these tests than male 
subjects can be attributed to a problem w i t h the tests 
themselves rather than w i t h female mora l responses. 
Indeed, receptive readings of these responses, open to their 
nuances, lead one to realize that standardly female and 
standardly male responses to these tests differentiate them-
selves from one another partly i n consequences of w o r k i n g 
from different conceptions both of self-other relations, and 
of persons w h o participate i n those relations. G i l l i g a n 
does not c l a i m explici t ly that these differences turn u p o n 
different evaluations of achieved autonomy; but, it is the 
autonomous endorsement of universalisable moral p r i n -
ciples that characterizes the responses of those w h o achieve 
the highest Kohlberg score. T h e female responses she 
elaborates manifest a greater concern w i t h relationship, 
connectedness, and car ing than w i t h independent self-
sufficiency. In m a k i n g audible the judgements of a differ-
ent moral voice, G i l l i g a n observes that a l though, statisti-
cally, it is women w h o have tended to speak i n this way, 
this can be explained to a great extent by the historically 
cont ingent structures of mother -dominated Western 
chi ld-rearing practices. 2 0 A l t h o u g h these two moral voices 
have tended to be marked "mascul ine" and " f e m i n i n e , " 
this is not a matter of b io log ica l necessity, as she sees it; 
both voices are available to women and men. 
G i l l i g a n does not propose an alternative feminine 
moral theory to replace traditional autonomy-oriented 
ones, nor are the theoretical underpinnings of her work 
such as to make a development of this sort possible. One of 
the values of the project is to indicate from another per-
spective that psychological-ontological assumptions about 
autonomy as the " n a t u r a l " end product of h u m a n devel-
opmental processes are indeed arbitrary. Once this is seen 
to be so, it is clear, again, that the hegemony of moral 
positions developed around this core is an assumed rather 
than a natural hegemony. 
A t this point , however, it is not my intention to draw 
together these strands of thought i n order to sketch out a 
new, care-oriented m o r a l theory. I have indicated some of 
the l imitat ions inherent i n autonomy-oriented "male-
stream" theories and have suggested reasons for these l i m -
itations i n some of the ontological presuppositions w i t h 
w h i c h they work . I have proposed that there might be a 
viable approach to m o r a l reflection to be developed out of 
ecological t h i n k i n g about relations of h u m a n beings to 
one another and to the w o r l d , taking values realized i n 
good friendships to be, i n some sense, a source of under-
standing. I am not convinced that this w o u l d , or should, 
result i n the development of a moral theory w h i c h , i m p l i c -
itly or explic i t ly , celebrates and grants centre stage to the 
different voice whose worthiness G i l l i g a n affirms. Despite 
her insistence that this is a voice i n w h i c h a l l can speak, its 
stereotypical female associations are s t i l l too strong for 
one to be sure that grant ing it the m a i n , or even an equal, 
speaking part w o u l d not risk s imply celebrating "the fem-
i n i n e " w i t h many of its negative connotations st i l l i n 
place, creating a new dichotomy whose terms need con-
stantly to be circumnavigated, or endorsing the age-old 
complimentari ty thesis. 
Indeed, any celebration of traditionally feminine modes 
w h i c h aims to revalue them yet leave them intact risks 
los ing sight of the constraints commonly attendant u p o n 
their manifestation. Where connectedness is the value i n 
quest ion, it is important to remember that, at least i n the 
past, women's concentration u p o n family and c o m m u n -
ity has l i m i t e d their abi l i ty to contest exploi tat ion, contri -
b u t i n g i n its o w n way to their powerlessness and oppres-
s ion. Seeking to juxtapose an ethics of car ing and 
responsibil i ty against an ethics of rights and justice offers 
few prospects, I suspect, of breaking out of the dichoto-
mies (for example, between duty and inc l ina t ion , p u b l i c 
and private) central to tradit ional moral t h i n k i n g . F r o m 
there it w o u l d be a small step back into the view that the 
former is female, morality, and, therefore, represents the 
(lesser) concerns of women, the latter male moral i ty 
representing the (more serious) concerns of men. W o m e n 
might , once again—or sti l l—be charged w i t h the moral 
guardianship of society, left to take care of its softer, more 
emotional requirements. 
It w o u l d be more valuable for these two strands of moral 
t h i n k i n g to be woven into a larger pattern of reflection 
u p o n h o w best to live w i t h other h u m a n beings and 
w i t h i n certain kinds of environment, so as to create ways 
of deve loping and recognizing a wider range of mora l 
considerations and values. I am not convinced that the a i m 
of such reflection should be that of constructing a new, 
alternative moral theory i n w h i c h lesser principles are 
derivable f rom more general or universal ones according 
to a strictly-conceived theoretical structure. In fact, per-
haps one of the broader and at the same time more radical 
effects of G i l l i g a n ' s work, and that of other feminist moral 
thinkers, is to suggest that the moral theories close off 
more possibilities of reflection and understanding than 
they open for considerat ion. 2 1 T o cast doubt u p o n the 
value of mora l theories, though, is to c l a i m more space for 
reflective practice, the value of w h i c h is perhaps obscured 
by theories w h i c h pose as the products of completed reflec-
t ion , but serve, rather, to foreclose it. T h e po int is, as 
Annette Baier puts it so w e l l , to explore different ways of 
being moral phi losophers . 2 2 
I n the k inds of reflective practice one might take to 
characterize these ways of being, certain principles and 
values c o u l d be central and might often act as g u i d i n g 
and/or regulat ing principles. In view of the ontology I 
w o u l d take to be at its core, it is clear that values such as 
trust, kindness, responsiveness and responsibility, honesty 
and care w o u l d figure prominent ly . In some circumstan-
ces ef f ic iency-maximizing and autonomy-promot ing val-
ues might seem to be more appropriately fostered. So it 
w o u l d be a n equally important part of this altered per-
spective o n moral matters to consider whether, or to what 
extent, the view that different values are appropriate to 
different situations really is the heresy that mora l theories, 
w i t h their monol i th ic structures, have l o n g assumed it to 
be. 2 3 
T h e ecological orientation I w o u l d envisage for reflec-
tive moral practice should serve to ensure that it does not 
dissolve into an anything goes, ad hoc approach to moral 
matters. It w o u l d leave considerable scope for trial and 
error, i n consequence of what certain practices and 
responses could be discernible as not conducive to the 
product ion of environmental (in the widest sense) condi-
tions that enable people to live wel l together. V i r g i n i a 
H e l d , for example, i n Rights and Goods, proposes that 
what might we l l be needed i n moral i n q u i r y is "some-
t h i n g comparable to but not the same as the encounter 
w i t h experience by w h i c h scientific theories are tested" 2 4 . 
W i t h reference to such testing procedures, some practices 
might be taken, tentatively, to be more appropriate than 
others as ways of w o r k i n g toward the creation of good 
environments, both h u m a n and " p h y s i c a l . " It is often 
easier (perhaps o n a loose analogy w i t h some sort of 
falsif iabil i ty theory) to see the inappropriateness of certain 
practices than it is to see w h i c h ones w o u l d , unequivo-
cally, be best. Developing accounts of how people should 
and should not conduct their lives—at least for now, i n 
circumstances such as these—is a little l ike unravel l ing a 
detective story: often it is abundantly clear how things 
could/should not be l o n g before one knows how they 
were, or should be. 
M o r a l practice of this sort should be able to encompass 
an acknowledgement that h u m a n beings always make 
choices from a certain specific posi t ion vis-a-vis other 
persons, w i t h i n certain environmental circumstances, and 
that there is no removed, God's-eye vantage point from 
w h i c h to pass judgement upo n them. In so doing, it w o u l d 
mainta in a continuity w i t h moral experiences, w h i c h tend 
to be filtered out by ideal, impart ia l theories for w h i c h 
autonomy itself, i n another of its connotations, might be 
taken to entail freedom from the contingencies of c ircum-
stance. A l t h o u g h reflective moral practice may wel l be a 
more modest endeavour than theory construction, it seems 
to have the potential to afford greater possibilities of 
accommodating some of the subtleties of the moral lives of 
actual, gendered, historically located h u m a n beings for 
w h o m the traditionally autonomous, impart ia l moral 
agent has come to be seen as a seriously flawed character. 
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i remember the sixties 
a l l those l o n g haired draft dodgers 
a l l those sons of Thet is 
k n o w i n g (however unconsciously) 
that a way to avoid k i l l i n g 
a way to stop m a k i n g war 
is to become women 
(however incompletely) 
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